Scoped Agent Identity for OT Systems
Giving an AI agent access to SCADA or historian systems is high-risk when every agent shares one broad service account instead of its own scoped identity.
What stands in the way
How Scrydon solves it
How this plays out
Most OT environments give every automated process the same broad service account, which means an agent that only needs to read sensor telemetry technically has the same access as one authorised to write control setpoints — a single compromised or misconfigured agent away from a real incident.
AI Agent Identity gives each agent its own federated identity with least-privilege, time-boxed permissions, so read access and write access are never bundled by default, and every action an agent takes against an OT system is individually attributable rather than hidden behind a shared account.
- Agents operate safely alongside OT systems with a fully attributable permission model, closing off a major class of agentic-AI risk in operational environments.
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